Absolute Criminal Liability Imposed for Printing Numbers Tickets by unknown
ABSOLUTE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IMPOSED FOR PRINTING
NUMBERS TICKETS
State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co.
200 N.E.2d 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963), aff'd,
176 Ohio St. 482, 200 N.E.2d 590 (1964)
A corporation was indicted for violating a statute which prohibits the
manufacture or printing of tickets for or representing an interest in the
numbers game.' The indictment against the corporation described the
offense in the language of the statute. Upon demurrer the common pleas
court ruled that the statute violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment because the statute did not require that the manufacturer
or printer have knowledge that the tickets were to be used in the numbers
game.2 The court of appeals reversed and remanded for further proceed-
ings,3 holding that it was not necessary for the trial court to consider
whether the tickets were in fact used or useful in the numbers game. The
court of appeals noted that the statutory prohibition was the printing of
tickets, not the illegal use of such tickets. The court stated further that the
statute is violated only when the material in question is printed if at that
time an ordinary man reading or examining the printed matter would
conclude that it represented a share or interest in a scheme of chance.
After examining a sample of the tickets, which was attached to the bill of
particulars, the court stated that "no ordinary person would consider these
books as being of such nature as to sound an alarm leading to an inquiry
as to whether the substantially blank sheets of paper had a special useful-
ness which was illicit under the statute." 4 The court concluded, however,
that even though the bill of particulars would have been dispositive of the
case in favor of the defendants, the bill of particulars could not be consid-
ered when ruling on the validity of the indictment. Therefore, the demurrer
was overruled.5
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed,6 holding that the indictment was
legally sufficient because it charged the offense in the words of the statute
and that the statute's silence on the question of intent indicated that the
General Assembly intended to make proof of specific intent unnecessary;
therefore, proof of a general intent to do the proscribed act was sufficient.
Judge Taft in his dissenting opinion supported the court of appeal's inter-
pretation of the statute, but disagreed with that court's treatment of the
bill of particulars, stating that it should have been considered on demurrer
1 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2915.11 (Page Supp. 1964). For the text of this statute,
see note 66 infra.
2 State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co., 88 Ohio L. Abs. 208, 182 N.E.2d 641 (C.P.
1961).
3 State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co., 200 N.E.2d 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
4 Id. at 589.
5 Id. at 590.
6 State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co., 176 Ohio St. 482, 200 N.E2d 590 (1964).
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to the indictment. Therefore, in Judge Taft's opinion, the demurrer should
have been sustained, since the bill of particulars showed that the defend-
ants had not been charged with violating the statute.7 The United States
Supreme Court denied review.8
The use of the bill of particulars has been a source of confusion in
Ohio law. Although the Ohio Constitution provides that accusation of a
criminal offense shall be by presentment of an indictment by the grand
jury,9 the constitution does not specify the content or form of the indict-
ment. Until the short-form pleading statutes were enacted in 1929, there
was no statutory authority for a bill of particulars ;1o therefore, an indict-
ment had to charge an offense with a high degree of particularity.:" The
defendant's right to particularity in the indictment was not a constitutional
right; it was a right judicially declared as part of the public policy of the
state as an essential element of the concept of fairness. 12 The purpose of
holding the state to a high degree of particularity in the indictment was to
enable the defendant and the court to know what particulars the defendant
would have to defend. This long-form indictment was a combination of
technical averments of law and statements of fact. If the charge in the
indictment was so general and vague that the defendant could not prepare
an adequate defense, the indictment was struck down and a costly and
time-consuming indictment had to be obtained.13 The disadvantages of
long-form pleading were remedied by the present statute which provides
that an indictment can be a general charge of the offense. 14 The technical
averments and particularity required in the long-form indictment are now
provided for the accused in a bill of particulars if seasonably requested. l'
When a bill of particulars is furnished to the accused, it serves to limit
the prosecution at trial to proof of its specifications. 16
The short-form pleading statutes of New York ' 7 and Massachusetts 13
are similar to those in Ohio. In both New York and Massachusetts, the
bill of particulars is considered as part of the indictment when the suffi-
7 Id. 488-89, 200 N.E.2d at 595-96 (dissenting opinion).
8 Lisbon Sales Book Co. v. Ohio, 33 U.S.L. Week 3250 (Jan. 26, 1965).
9 Ohio Const. art 1, § 10.
10 See McCullough, "The Role of the Bill of Particulars in Criminal Cases,"
55 Ohio Op. 278 (1955).
11 See State v. Boyatt, 114 Ohio St. 397, 151 N.E. 468 (1926); Lamberton v.
State, 11 Ohio 282 (1842); Anderson v. State, 7 Ohio (part 2) 250 (1836).
12 McCullough, supra note 10, at 279.
13 DuBrul v. State, 80 Ohio St. 52, 87 N.E. 837 (1909); State v. Trisler, 49
Ohio St. 583, 31 N.E. 881 (1892) ; Fouts v. State, 8 Ohio St. 98 (1857) ; Dillingham
v. State, 5 Ohio St. 280 (1855).
14 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2941.05 (Page 1953).
"5 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2941.07 (Page 1953).
16 State v. DeRighter, 145 Ohio St. 552, 62 N.E2d 332 (1945); State v. Whit-
more, 126 Ohio St. 381, 185 N.E. 547 (1933).
'7 N. Y. Code Crirn. Proc. § 295a-1.
38 Mass. Ann. Laws. ch. 277, § 34 (1956).
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ciency of the indictment is questioned by demurrer.19 The New York Court
of Appeals in People v. Bogdanoff 2 indicated that the New York Con-
stitution entitles the accused to a bill of particulars. The New York court
reasoned that when indictments constituted the sole formulation of an
accusation, the defendant's right to know the nature and cause of the
accusation was protected by requiring particularity in the indictment.
Upon the New York legislature's authorization of short-form indictments,
however, the bill of particulars became mandatory and now must be read
with the indictment in order to protect the rights of the accused. 21 The
Massachusetts Constitution requires the offense to be fully described to
the accused. 22 Even though this requirement may be satisfied by the
indictment alone, the bill of particulars is still mandatory and must be read
along with the indictment. 23 Thus, the accused has no constitutional right
to a bill of particulars; but, as in New York, the bill of particulars is essen-
tial in determining the sufficiency of the indictment. Therefore, the short-
form accusatory procedure as it is used in New York and Massachusetts
appears to give better protection to the rights of the accused than did the
long-form indictment.24 Conversely, the Ohio procedure as expressed by
the court of appeals in State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co. 25 seems to enable
the prosecution to withstand demurrer to the indictment at the expense of
subjecting the accused to a meaningless trial.
The Ohio law regarding the effect of the bill of particulars on the
sufficiency of the indictment is not as well settled as the court of appeals
in Lisbon indicated it to be. As recently as 1958 one court of appeals
recognized that the Ohio Supreme Court had not clarified the law regard-
ing the use of the bill of particulars in situations such as Lisbon.26 In
19 See People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890 (1930); Commonwealth
v. Diamond, 248 Mass. 511, 143 N.E. 503 (1924); cf. Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 277,
§ 34 (1956).
20 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890 (1930).
21 Id. at 24, 171 N.E. at 895.
22 Mass. Const. § 13.
23 The bill of particulars is mandatory in the sense that when an indictment is
specific enough to charge the accused with a particular crime and thus pass the con-
stitutional test, but is not specific enough to enable the accused to prepare an adequate
defense, the accused has a statutory right to a bill of particulars. Commonwealth v.
Jordon, 207 Mass. 259, 93 N.E. 809 (1911).
24 In People v. Bogdanoff, supra note 20, the court indicated that under the long-
form pleading procedure, courts were more interested in technical perfection, and the
pleader, if he followed the common law forms, might draft an indictment sufficient
to withstand demurrer even though such an indictment might give little information
as to the nature or cause of the accusation. The short-form procedure better protects
the rights of the accused by doing away with the technicalities and formalism of
the old-style pleading and concentrating instead upon giving the accused actual notice
of what he will have to defend. See also State v. Engler, 217 Iowa 138, 251 N.W.
88 (1933) ; Commonwealth v. Peakes, 231 Mass. 449, 121 N.E. 420 (1918) ; Common-
wealth v. Farmer, 218 Mass. 507, 106 N.E. 150 (1914); State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397,
60 P.2d 646 (1936).
25 Supra note 3.
26 State v. Carey, 107 Ohio App. 149, 157 N.E.2d 381 (1958).
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Harris v. State12 the Ohio Supreme Court held that the material and
essential elements constituting an offense are to be found by presentment
by the grand jury, and a court cannot amend an indictment to supply such
elements when they have been omitted from the indictment. The court
reasoned that to allow such an amendment "would not only violate the
constitutional rights of the accused, but would also allow the court to
convict him on an indictment essentially different from that found by the
grand jury."2
The Ohio Supreme Court dealt directly with the question of the
effect of the bill of particulars on the indictment in State v. Whitinore.2 9
In that case, the court stated in dictum that the prosecuting attorney has
the right to amend the indictment and the power to furnish the accused
with a bill of particulars so long as such action does not prejudice the
rights of the accused. The argument usually advanced to deny the use of
the bill of particulars when testing the sufficiency of the indictment is that
the bill of particulars enables the prosecutor to substitute his whim and
caprice for the findings of the grand jury. 0 The court in Whitmore
answered this argument by stating that:
Under such circumstances the indictment and the bill of par-
ticulars constitute the charge against the accused. If, after the
accused has been furnished with a bill of particulars, the charge
remains vague, indefinite or uncertain, or fails to state facts suffi-
cient to constitute an offense under the laws of the state, then the
accused has a right to resort [to] . . . demurrer.3 1
Since Whitmore, the courts of appeals have treated Whitmore and
Harris as conflicting on the question of the effect of the bill of particulars
on the indictment.32 This apparent conflict arises from the holding in
Harris that an essentially deficient indictment cannot be cured by a bill of
particulars and from the dictum in Whitmore that the bill of particulars
27 125 Ohio St. 257, 181 N.E. 104 (1932).
28 Id. at 264, 181 N.E. at 106. See also State v. Wozniak, 172 Ohio St. 517, 178
N.E.2d 800 (1961); State v. Cimpritz, 158 Ohio St. 409, 110 N.E2d 416 (1953);
State v. Parker, 150 Ohio St. 22, 80 N.E2d 490 (1948).
29 126 Ohio St. 381, 185 N.E. 547 (1933).
30 Id. at 387, 185 N.E. at 550.
31 Id. at 387-88, 185 N.E. at 550.
32 In State v. Gossler, 42 Ohio L. Abs. 138, 57 N.E.2d 677 (Ct. App. 1944),
the Court of Appeals of Franklin County decided that in determining the sufficiency
of an indictment, the indictment and bill of particulars should be considered together.
Later that year, however, the same court stated that the obvious conclusion to be
drawn from WIztmore is that the bill of particulars does not effect the sufficiency
of the indictment. State v. Collett, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 225, 58 N.E2d 417 (Ct. App.
1944). In Campfield v. State, 91 Ohio App. 74, 105 N.E2d 661 (1950), the Court
of Appeals of Franklin County, on facts similar to Harris in that an essential element
of the offense was omitted in the indictment, found that the indictment before the
court did not charge an offense against the state. The court distinguished the language
on the bill of particulars in Wlhitmore as being only dictum and, therefore, not con-
trolling.
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should be considered when the indictment is too vague, indefinite, or
uncertain. However, the conflict between Harris and Whitmore is merely
superficial when it is recognized that the basic consideration of both posi-
tions is the protection of the rights of the accused. Whitmore merely says
that a bill of particulars or an amendment to an indictment will not be
considered in testing the sufficiency of an indictment when to give effect
to them would prejudice the rights of the accused. On the other hand,
Harris simply states that it would be prejudicial to the accused's constitu-
tional right of indictment by grand jury to allow an amendment or bill of
particulars to supply an essential allegation missing in the indictment.
It is evident, then, that the function of the bill of particulars is to
protect the accused by informing him of the exact nature of the charge.
The indictment and the bill of particulars, therefore, are not opposites, one
of which must prevail, but are complementary, since the latter supplements
the generality of the former. It has also been established that the benefits
of the bill of particulars are intended for the defendant, not the state, and
that the purpose of the short-form pleading procedure is to speed up
criminal justice without depriving the accused of his rights.33 Had the
court of appeals in Lisbon given proper consideration to the bill of par-
ticulars on demurrer, these purposes and objectives would have been ful-
filled. Obviously the rights of the accused would not have been violated
since the bill of particulars clearly showed that no offense was charged.
To hold, as the court of appeals did in Lisbon, that an indictment is suffi-
cient for all purposes once it meets the minimum constitutional require-
ments is to ignore the very distinction between long- and short-form plead-
ing. Such a holding ignores the General Assembly's obvious realization
that the general language of a short-form indictment might be subject to
more than one interpretation, a contingency which the legislators provided
'for by giving the accused a statutory right to a bill of particulars. When,
as in Lisbon, the general language of an indictment has been given sub-
stance by a bill of particulars and, as particularized, the indictment does
not charge the accused with committing any criminal offense, it is certainly
an anomalous application of the rule of Harris to ignore the bill of par-
ticulars and force the defendant to proceed through a meaningless trial.
The court of appeals in Lisbon reasoned that since a defective indictment
cannot be cured by a bill of particulars, neither can a bill of particulars
create a defect in a valid indictment.3 4 This application of the mutuality
doctrine is clearly fallacious, because the benefits of the bill of particulars
are intended for the accused, not the state.3 5
The Ohio Supreme Court in Lisbon avoided questions about the bill
of particulars by its interpretation of the statute. In the syllabus of its
opinion, the court stated that proof of general intent to do the proscribed
act was sufficient; therefore, it was not necessary for the prosecution to
prove specific intent.36 It must be assumed that the court in distinguishing
33 State v. Whitmore, supra note 29, at 386, 185 N.E. at 550.
34 Supra note 3, at 590.
35 State v. Whitmore, supra note 29, at 386, 185 N.E. at 550.
36 State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co., siepra note 6.
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between general and specific intent meant that the prosecution is not
required to prove that the defendant specifically intended to print numbers
tickets, but that the prosecution must prove only that the defendant in-
tended to print items which were in fact numbers tickets. Whether the
defendants subjectively knew or had reason to know that the printed matter
was numbers tickets is irrelevant under the supreme court's interpretation
of the statute. However, having expressly eliminated specific intent and
guilty knowledge from the prosecution's requirement of proof, it is difficult
to understand why the court's opinion dealt so extensively with the pre-
sumption of guilty knowledge.3 7 The court in Lisbon appears to rely upon
the presumption of guilty knowledge, not as a substitute for the require-
ment of specifically alleging and proving guilty knowledge, in which case
the presumption would at least be rebuttable,38 but as support for imposing
absolute liability. In effect, the court may be saying that one of the reasons
why the General Assembly can impose strict liability by this statute is
that knowledge can be presumed from the situation described by the statute.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the authority which allegedly supports
this contention.
In support of the presumption of knowledge in Lisbon, the court
referred to two situations in which knowledge is presumed: (1) where
knowledge is of language, men, and things which commonly prevails, and
(2) where the nature of an offense is such that when it is charged specifi-
cally the charge will contain within its terms an averment of knowledge.39
An example of the first situation is a common pleas decision which held
that a fair is something so public in nature that it can be presumed that
anyone within a two-mile radius would know of it. 4 0 As an example of
the second situation described by the court, the charge of keeping a dis-
orderly house has been held to contain a sufficient allegation of guilty
knowledge, since a person could not keep a disorderly house without knowl-
edge thereof.4 ' It is difficult to appreciate how either of these situations
described and relied upon by the court is analogous to the facts of Lisbon.
37 On the other hand, if guilty knowledge is presumed it need not be averred,
and it has been said that all men are presumed to have that knowledge of
language, men, and things which commonly prevails. So too, as a general
rule, where a statute or ordinance is silent as to the defendant's knowledge,
the indictment or other accusation need not allege guilty knowledge....
The nature of an offense may be such that when it is charged specifically,
the charge will contain within its terms an averment of knowledge. For in-
stance, charges of concealing stolen goods and keeping a disorderly house
have been held sufficient allegation of scienter, since a person could not have
"stolen" goods or "keep a disorderly house;" without knowledge thereof...
The language of the indictment in the case at bar in its terms descriptive
of the offense, in substance, alleges knowledge.
176 Ohio St. at 485-86, 200 N.E.2d at 593-94.
38 Irrebuttable presumptions can only be justified by the clearest expediency and
soundest policy. United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272, 282 (1934).
39 See note 37 supra.
40 State v. Fromer, 7 Ohio N.P. 172 (C.P. 1897).
41 Brown v. Toledo, 7 Ohio N.P. 435 (C.P. 1900).
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In order for these situations to support a presumption of knowledge in
Lisbon, the identity of a numbers ticket must be something so common
that all men can be presumed to recognize one on sight. The court of
appeals, however, found that the tickets printed by the defendant were
such that not even an ordinary man would suspect that they were numbers
tickets.42 The inevitable conclusion is that either the identity of numbers
tickets is not common knowledge or that the tickets which the defendant
was charged with printing were not numbers tickets. If either conclusion
is correct, it points up the fallacy of the court's argument of presumption
of knowledge in Lisbon. If the identity of numbers tickets is not common
knowledge, there is no basis for holding that a charge of printing numbers
tickets presumes guilty knowledge; and if the identity of numbers tickets
is common knowledge, then the bill of particulars clearly shows that the
defendants did not print numbers tickets. Since the court could not validly
presume guilty knowledge for any purpose in Lisbon, the presence of that
doctrine in the opinion is confusing and serves to obscure the apparent
holding of the court that the statute imposes liability regardless of any
intent or knowledge. In light of this holding, it is profitable to examine
briefly the concept of absolute criminal liability.
In 1846 an English court found a retail tobacco dealer guilty of having
in his possession adulterated tobacco, despite the fact that he did not know
nor have reason to suspect that it was adulterated.43 In 1864 a Massachu-
setts court reached the same result as the English decision, upholding a
conviction for selling adulterated milk although the defendant was ignorant
of the adulteration.44 The relevant factors considered by the Massachusetts
court in holding the defendant absolutely liable were the lightness of the
penalty, the language of the statute, the impracticability of requiring proof
of knowledge, the importance of protecting the community against the
common adulteration of food, and the reasonableness of imposing the risk
upon the dealer and thus holding him absolutely liable. Since that decision,
the arguments in support of absolute criminal liability have continued to be
precisely the same. 45
The United States Supreme Court in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Min-
nesota 46 held that the absolute criminal liability doctrine does not neces-
sarily violate the due process provision of the fourteenth amendment, but
the Court in a later decision cautioned that "neither this court nor, so far
as we are aware, any other has undertaken to delineate a precise line or set
forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require
a mental element and crimes that do not." 47 In United States v. Balint 48
the Supreme Court followed the rationale of Shevlin-Carpenter in finding
that it was not necessary to show that the defendant knowingly sold nar-
42 200 N.E2d 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
43 Regina v. Woodrow, 15 M. & W. 404, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Ex. 1846).
44 Commonwealth v. Farren, 91 Mass. ( 9 Allen) 489 (1864).
45 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 328 (2d ed. 1960).
46 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
47 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952).
48 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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cotics. The Court there observed that Congress had weighed the possible
injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the greater evil
of exposing innocent purchasers to the danger of the drugs and that Con-
gress chose to avoid the latter result. An important consideration to the
Court was the fact that there was an opportunity for the seller to discover
that he possessed and was selling narcotics. 4 9 In United States v. Dotter-
weich, 50 the Supreme Court classified statutes which impose absolute crimi-
nal liability as legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of
regulation. This classification implied that such legislation should not im-
pose imprisonment as a sanction, and this was followed in Morissette v.
United States,5 ' where the Court said, "penalties commonly are relatively
small, and conviction does no grave danger to an offender's reputation. 52
Another statement of Dotterweich, affirmed in Morissette, was that absolute
criminal liability is only imposed upon an innocent person when that person
stands in some responsible relation to a public danger. 53
State v. Kelly,54 the first Ohio case upholding absolute liability, was
decided fourteen years before the Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of absolute liability statutes in Shevlin-Carpenter.5 5 The penalty im-
posed in Kelly was a one hundred dollar fine 56 and the offense was the
sale of adulterated food, which is one of the typical offenses included in the
category of public welfare offenses. Although there is a line of cases
following the Kelly rationale,57 there has also developed a line of cases
holding that even where the legislative definition of an offense indicates
that no intent is required, scienter is an element of the offense. 58 In the
49 Id. at 254.
50 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
51 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
52 Id. at 256.
53 Ibid. The Court said: "The accused, if he does not vill the violation, usually is
in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and
no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his re-
sponsibilities."
54 54 Ohio St. 166, 43 N.E. 163 (1896).
5 Supra note 46.
rX State v. Kelly, mepra note 54.
57 State v. Morello, 169 Ohio St. 213, 158 N.E.2d 525 (1959); Taugher v. Ling,
127 Ohio St. 142, 187 N.E. 19 (1933); Kendall v. State, 113 Ohio St. 111, 148 N.E.
367 (1925) ; Portage Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N.E. 283 (1924) ;
State v. Rippeth, 71 Ohio St. 85, 72 N.E. 298 (1904) ; Stranahan Bros. Catering Co.
v. Coit, 55 Ohio St. 398, 45 N.E. 634 (1896) ; Meyer v. State, 54 Ohio St. 242, 43
N.E. 164 (1896) ; State v. Kominis, 73 Ohio App. 204, 55 N.E2d 344 (1943) ; White
v. State, 44 Ohio App. 331, 185 N.E. 64 (1933).
58 Holt v. State, 107 Ohio St. 307, 140 N.E. 349 (1923); State v. Cameron, 91
Ohio St. 50, 109 N.E. 584 (1914) ; Kilbourne v. State, 84 Ohio St. 247, 95 N.E. 824
(1911) ; Farrel v. State, 32 Ohio St. 456 (1877) ; Crabtree v. State, 30 Ohio St. 382
(1876) ; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475 (1854) ; Birney v. State, 8 Ohio 230 (1837) ;
Anderson v. State, 7 Ohio (part 2) 250 (1836) ; State v. Williams, 94 Ohio App.
249, 115 N.E.2d 36 (1952).
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leading case, Kilbourne v. State,59 the court asked, "To break up the market
for [stolen] gas and water pipe, should the legislature make an innocent
buyer a criminal?" 60 The statute held unconstitutional in Kilbourne pro-
vided that whoever bought, received, or unlawfully had in his possession
certain articles removed from railroad cars, regardless of knowledge, should
upon conviction be imprisoned. In State v. Williams,61 a recent court of
appeals case which reviewed the Kelly and Kilbourne lines of decisions, the
court interpreted a statute 62 imposing liability for the possession of under-
sized fish to apply only to those who at least had an opportunity to inspect
the fish. During the course of its opinion, the court was unsuccessful in its
attempt to reconcile the cases following Kelly and those following Kil-
bourne. From Williams, it is evident that the constitutionality of strict
liability depends primarily upon the facts of each case.6 3
In determining the constitutionality of section 2915.11 of the Ohio
Revised Code, the statute under consideration in Lisbon, the Ohio Supreme
Court should have considered whether the accused had an opportunity to
learn those facts which, if known, would have imparted guilty knowledge,
whether the defendants stood in a responsible relation to a public danger,
and whether the sanctions of the statute are of a regulatory or punitive
nature.
Applying these standards to Lisbon, it can be seen that there was no
opportunity for the defendant to discover that the printed items were
numbers tickets. Unlike adulterated food, narcotics, or alcohol, objects
commonly dealt with by welfare statutes and situations in which the
object itself might serve to warn anyone dealing with it of its potential
dangers, the tickets in Lisbon by admission of the court of appeals were
innocent in appearance and not dangerous in any way.64 Also it is un-
59 84 Ohio St. 247, 95 N.E. 824 (1911).
60 Id. at 256, 95 N.E. at 826.
61 Supra note 58.
62 Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 1533.63 (Page 1964).
63 In effect the court concludes that a statute which is silent upon the question of
knowledge may be interpreted to impose absolute liability upon those (1) who have
the means of knowledge and (2) who, regardless of the means of knowledge, must be
held liable in the interest of the public weal. State v. Williams, supra note 58, at 255,
115 N.E.2d at 38. This conclusion does not reconcile the different lines of decision, but
merely restates the proposition that in certain instances public policy demands that
someone be held liable. Therefore, the determination of which instances must depend
upon the relevant factors of each case.
64 Judge Taft, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Lisbon because he felt that
the statute only required that a reasonable man be able to ascertain that the printed
matter was numbers tickets, wrote a concurring opinion in State v. Morello, 169 Ohio
St. 213, 158 N.E.2d 525 (1959), stating that the arbitrariness of a statute imposing
absolute liability may make such a statute unconstitutional. He suggested that the
statute involved there was constitutional because a reasonable amount of diligence
would have enabled the accused to discover the fact which would have given him
scienter. Thus, to Judge Taft it seems that a minimum constitutional requirement of
a criminal statute is that it punish only those who have at least an opportunity to
know of the facts which make their action illegal.
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deniable that the real legislative objective of the statute is to prevent
gambling in the numbers racket. This factor, coupled with the requirement
that the defendant stand in some responsible relation to the public danger
in order to be subjected to absolute liability, further illustrates the fallibil-
ity of Lisbon. It is clear that where one is in a position to reduce public
danger by cautious conduct, a statute requiring him so to act is not un-
reasonable. In Lisbon, however, there is nothing that the printer could
do to prevent gambling in the numbers racket because there was no way
for him to discover the danger by examining the items he had innocently
printed. The real danger would have attached to the printed tickets only
after they were out of the defendants' control. The defendants' activity in
printing the tickets, therefore, was too far removed from the public danger
of gambling for the General Assembly reasonably to hold these defendants
absolutely liable.
In considering the sanctions of section 2915.11 of the Ohio Revised
Code and their effect on the defendants' reputations if they are convicted,
it is worth noting that this statute as originally enacted did not include a
prohibition against the printing or manufacturing of numbers tickets and
that a violation of the statute was only a misdemeanor.6 5 In 1961 the
statute was amended to include printers and manufacturers of numbers
tickets, and the penalty for violating the statute was increased, making
such violation a felony. 60 One of the considerations of the United States
Supreme Court in refusing to impose absolute liability in Morissette v.
United States was the fact that the offense charged was historically a
felony.67 The felony-misdemeanor distinction, based primarily upon the
difference in severity of penalties, is pertinent to the question of the rea-
sonableness of any statute which imposes liability without fault. Since a
major concern is the reasonableness of damaging the reputation of a
05 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2915.11 (Page 1953):
No person shall vend, sell, barter, or dispose of a ticket, order, or device
for or representing a number of shares or an interest in a scheme of chance
known as "policy," "numbers game," "clearing house," or by words or terms
of similar import...
Whoever violates this section shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars
or imprisoned not more than six months, or both for a first offense...
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1.06 (Page 1953) provides that "offenses which may be
punished by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary are felonies; all other
offenses are misdemeanors ....." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1.05 (Page 1953) defines
"imprisoned":
"imprisoned" means imprisoned in the county jail if the maximum term pre-
scribed for the offense is one year or less, and imprisoned in the penitentiary
if the maximum term prescribed for the offense is longer than one year.
66 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2915.11 (Page Supp. 1964):
No person shall manufacture, print ... [a] device for or representing a
number of shares or an interest in a scheme of chance known as "policy,"
"numbers game,". . . . Whoever violates this section shall be fined not less
than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned not
less than one nor more than three years.
67 Supra note 47.
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presumably morally innocent person who happens to violate the statute,
the amount of such damage that will be reasonable will vary with the
relative social good that will be accomplished by enforcing the statute.
Since it has already been established that the defendants in Lisbon were
not in a position to reduce the danger of gambling, no amount of damage
to their reputation can be justified and the misdemeanor-felony distinction
is irrelevant. But even assuming that the defendants in Lisbon were in a
responsible relation to the public danger, there is no justification for making
the violation of the statute in question a felony instead of a misdemeanor.
The objective of public welfare statutes is to regulate, not punish ;68 yet
imprisonment in the state penitentiary for one to three years certainly is
more aptly characterized as punitive than regulatory. Implicit in such
imprisonment is the idea that the defendants were guilty of some moral or
social misconduct. The damage to the defendants' reputation, as compared
to the damage to reputation resulting from a fine or confinement in the
county jail, would seem to be much greater than any gain in regulatory
value under the facts in Lisbon. Therefore, the attempt by the General
Assembly to attach damaging penal sanctions to such possibly innocent
behavior is unreasonable-it stretches the welfare legislation doctrine be-
yond any redeeming social justification.
Even though it appears that the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted
section 2915.11 of the Code as imposing absolute liability, it is quite
probable that the defendants' in Lisbon will raise the defense of mistake
of fact or "no knowledge" at trial. This defense usually has not been
available to one who violates a public welfare statute, even if the mistake
is reasonable. 69 However, there are instances where exceptions have been
made to the rule, such as when the mistake is due to infancy, insanity,
coverture, or necessity.70
In two recent decisions the California Supreme Court accepted mistake
as a valid defense to prosecutions for violations of welfare statutes.71 That
court did not base its ruling on any exceptions to the rule that mistake is
no defense, but disregarded the rule itself, holding in both cases that a
reasonable, mistaken belief in certain facts is a valid defense.72 In both
of those decisions the California court utilized a statute which provides that
"In every crime of public offense there must exist a union, or joint opera-
tion of act and intent, or criminal negligence." 73
Considering that there is no Ohio statutory provision similar to section
20 of the California Penal Code and that the opinion in Lisbon gave no
68 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280, 281 (1943).
69 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 373 (2d ed. 1960).
70 State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 522, 126 N.W. 454, 457 (1910).
71 People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673 (1964); People v. Vogel,
46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P2d 850 (1956).
72 In People v. Hernandez, supra note 71, the court held that the defendant's
reasonable belief that a girl was old enough to give consent would be a valid
defense to a statutory rape charge. In People v. Vogel, supra note 71, good faith
belief that the defendant's former wife had obtained a divorce was a valid defense to a
bigamy charge.
73 Cal. Pen. Code § 20.
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indication that lack of knowledge is now to be a valid defense in prosecu-
tions under a public welfare statute, it must be assumed that the rule has
not been changed in Ohio and that mistake of fact will not prove a valid
defense in Lisbon.
In summary, the court of appeals' holding that the statute imposes
criminal liability only if a reasonable man would recognize the printed
matter as a numbers ticket is a just interpretation of section 2915.11. That
court's improper exclusion of the bill of particulars, however, diminished
the reasonableness of its statutory interpretation. The supreme court did
not have to consider the effect of the bill of particulars on the indictment
since, under its holding of absolute criminal liability, an accused's mistake
of fact or lack of knowledge is immaterial. However, the supreme court's
interpretation of the statute, far from falling within the category of
acceptable interpretation of public welfare statutes, is clearly unreasonable.

